Zasada racji dostatecznej w kontekście semantycznej kontrowersji realizm–antyrealizm

  1. Jarosław Boruszewski


Principle of sufficient reason in the context of the realism–antirealism semantic controversy

The topic of this article is the cognitive and semantic status of Michael Dummett’s principle C. According to the principle, if a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true. The author suggests the interpretation of principle C in terms of the sufficient reason principle as a contemporary, weaker and semantic counterpart of the classical version of the principle. Considerations include such problems as: the distinction between the reason-consequence relationship and cause-effect relationship; the reductionism and justificationism in the context of the realism-antirealism semantic controversy; the reversibility of reason-consequence relationship and the question of a search for ultimate reasons. The author also distinguishes three forms of the sufficient reason principle: metaphysical, ontological and propositional.

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Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

8, 2013, z. 1

Pages from 7 to 23

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